



Executive Summary

This report presents the findings of the “Akanates” observation mission on the pre-election period ahead of the 7 June 2026 elections to the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia. The reporting period covers 23 May to 4 June 2026 and focuses on the conduct of the campaign, the work of election administration bodies, the activities of political parties and alliances, the use of administrative resources, campaign finance, and reported violations.

This executive summary is an unofficial English summary prepared for informational purposes. In case of any discrepancy or ambiguity, the Armenian original report should be consulted.

Akanates applied a comprehensive, multi-source observation methodology combining desk research, field monitoring, official inquiries, semi-structured interviews, meetings, media and social media monitoring, and citizen reports received through the iditord.org platform. Field observation was carried out by 61 long-term observers covering the service areas of all 38 territorial electoral commissions. During the reporting period, observers conducted 57 visits to territorial electoral commissions, observed 65 training sessions for precinct electoral commission members, visited 129 party and alliance offices, attended 259 campaign events, held 42 meetings with local self-government representatives, conducted 854 interviews involving 920 citizens, and held 48 meetings with other relevant stakeholders.

Overall, the work of election commissions proceeded largely in a regular manner. The Central Electoral Commission held eight sessions during the reporting period, adopted 23 decisions, and generally ensured public accessibility of its meetings through broadcasts and recordings, except in cases related to prosecutor’s motions. At the same time, the report notes that CEC agendas and decisions continue to be published mainly in PDF format, most of which are not machine-readable, limiting the usability of official electoral data. Territorial electoral commissions mainly dealt with technical and organisational matters, including amendments to polling station lists and changes in precinct commission composition. Training sessions for precinct electoral commission members were generally assessed positively, although shortcomings were recorded in attendance, logistics, technical equipment, classroom management, and participant discipline.

The report raises concerns regarding the political neutrality of some precinct electoral commission members. Several cases were recorded where commission members or chairs participated in or promoted campaign activities, including through attendance at rallies, wearing party symbols, sharing campaign materials online, or otherwise engaging in partisan activity. Such cases are particularly concerning given the obligation of election commission members to maintain political neutrality and public confidence in the impartial administration of elections.

The observation also identified problems related to political parties' cooperation with observers and transparency of campaign infrastructure. In some cases, party offices refused to provide information or obstructed observers' access, including cases involving both ruling and opposition forces. The report also notes that several parties' campaign programmes were not available on the CEC website on the eve of the elections, although some of these parties had published their programmes on their own websites. In Kapan, observers identified party offices that appeared not to have been included in campaign fund declarations.

A significant part of the report concerns campaign violations. Observers recorded numerous cases of campaign materials being placed in unauthorised locations, exceeding allocated spaces, being concentrated disproportionately in certain areas, or being damaged. Such cases involved several political forces, including Civil Contract, Strong Armenia, Prosperous Armenia, the National Democratic Pole, and the Armenia alliance. The report also highlights a case in Kapan where a large illuminated number associated with Strong Armenia's ballot number was installed on a hilltop structure and may reasonably be considered campaign-related material.

The report documents repeated citizen reports concerning the organised transportation of voters from abroad, particularly from Russia, allegedly to support the Strong Armenia alliance. Observers recorded 46 cases in which respondents specifically referred to the organisation and coordination of the arrival of persons from Russia and indicated that these persons were expected or encouraged to support Strong Armenia. While these reports are based on citizen testimonies and require further investigation by competent authorities, they point to serious concerns regarding possible material inducement, organised mobilisation, and undue influence on voters.

A number of incidents related to pressure, violence, and obstruction were also recorded. The report refers to information about violence against Strong Armenia campaigners in the Masis community, allegedly involving the head of the local Yerkrpah Volunteers Union branch and his supporters. Observers also faced non-cooperation from local authorities in certain communities, including refusals to engage on election-related matters or to act on reports of campaign materials placed in unauthorised locations.

The involvement of minors in campaign activities was one of the recurring concerns during the reporting period. The report documents numerous cases in which children or teenagers

participated in rallies, carried party symbols, distributed campaign materials, chanted slogans, performed organisational tasks, or were otherwise used in political campaign settings. These cases involved several political forces and took place in different communities across Armenia. Particularly serious concerns are raised in relation to reports that minors were offered payment to distribute campaign materials without proper volunteer agreements.

The report also records cases suggesting the involvement of educational institutions and their staff in campaign activities. In several instances, teachers, school administrators, cultural institution staff, and students or children were allegedly encouraged or mobilised to participate in campaign events. The report identifies specific cases where school or cultural institution officials appeared to use their position to facilitate campaign participation, prompting Akanates to submit applications and claims to competent bodies, including the Central Electoral Commission, territorial electoral commissions, and the Administrative Court.

The use of administrative resources is presented as one of the major concerns of the reporting period. The report identifies several cases involving the apparent use of public-sector human resources in favour of the ruling Civil Contract party, including the participation or mobilisation of public employees, local officials, school staff, healthcare workers, cultural institution staff, and municipal employees in campaign events. Reports were also received concerning organised transportation of public employees to campaign rallies and instructions allegedly issued to subordinate staff to attend political events. In Syunik, the report also refers to allegations that local administrative figures urged residents to vote for the Wings of Unity party.

The report further points to possible misuse of material and financial public resources. Examples include the alleged use of a service vehicle for campaign-related movement, the publicisation of community-funded transport improvements shortly before the elections, and infrastructure works that appeared to facilitate campaign events. While such cases require legal assessment, they raise concerns about the blurred line between public administration and campaign activity.

A particularly serious case concerns alleged pressure on employees of a municipal utility body in Sisian. According to the report, around 40 employees were allegedly warned to vote for the ruling party and were then collectively re-registered to vote at a different polling station, where the precinct electoral commission chair was reportedly their superior and was appointed by Civil Contract. The report suggests that this may amount to an attempt to make voting behaviour more controllable through workplace leverage and organised changes in voter registration.

The report also addresses the role of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the campaign environment. It notes instances in which clergy or church leadership publicly demonstrated support or sympathy toward specific political actors. These cases include the Catholicos' visit to

Strong Armenia leader Samvel Karapetyan during the active campaign period and statements made by a cleric in Ararat that could be interpreted as election-related guidance to parishioners.

In terms of campaign finance, the report states that as of 27 May 2026, the campaign funds of 18 political forces had received a total of 1.239 billion AMD. The largest shares were received by Civil Contract, Strong Armenia, the Armenia alliance, and Prosperous Armenia. The report also notes that four political forces received more than 85 percent of all donations made to party bank accounts. At the same time, concerns were identified regarding transparency and accountability, including a discrepancy related to the Christian Democratic Party's campaign fund and issues raised by media investigations concerning the reliability of party financial reporting.

In conclusion, the report finds that while the election administration largely continued its technical preparations, the pre-election environment was marked by multiple and diverse concerns. These included possible misuse of administrative resources, involvement of public-sector employees and minors in campaign activities, unequal or unlawful placement of campaign materials, obstruction of observers, allegations of organised voter mobilisation from abroad, pressure on employees, and shortcomings in campaign finance transparency. The findings indicate the need for prompt and effective responses by competent state bodies, stronger enforcement of electoral rules, improved transparency of election administration data, and greater safeguards against the misuse of public authority and vulnerable groups in electoral processes.